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I. INTRODUCMION
Although a corporation is a legal entity in the eyes of the law, it
must act through its agents. A vast body of law has developed the
contractual, tort, criminal, and statutory liabilities of corporations for
the acts of their agents. For purposes of imposing liability upon the
corporation in these different contexts, the law in effect treats the acts
of a corporate agent as the acts of the corporation.
While a corporation is often a tempting target of litigation be-
cause of its financial resources or visibility, the liability of corporate
agents in various contexts should not be overlooked for a number of
important reasons. First, a corporate agent may have substantial per-
sonal assets or insurance, particularly where the agent is a high mana-
gerial agent of a large corporation or the major shareholder in a
closely-held corporation.
Second, a small closely-held corporation may be thinly capitalized
or even insolvent. In this situation, the corporation may not be an
attractive party to pursue. In some cases a court might be persuaded
to disregard the corporate entity and impose liability upon some of
the corporate shareholders, but this is usually an uphill battle.1 The
concept of limited shareholder liability serves the important policy of
encouraging capital formation,2 and the presumption is that the corpo-
rate entity will be respected.3 As a result, theories which permit a
court to impose liability on parties associated with the corporation
without taking the drastic step of disregarding the corporate entity can
be very attractive.
Third, the deterrent functions of tort and criminal liability cannot
be adequately served solely by imposing liability on the corporate en-
tity. Imposing liability on a corporation for the torts of its servants
may encourage the corporation to exercise care in the hiring, training
1. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,683 (4th Cir.
1976) (stating that the power to pierce the corporate veil is to be exercised "reluctantly" and
"cautiously").
2. See Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So.2d, 296, 299 (La. Ct. App. 1964) ("The protection of
limited liability for venture or investment capital is essential to the efficient operation of a sys-
tem of free enterprise.").
3. DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 683 (presuming that a corporation and its sharehold-
ers are separate and distinct).
[Vol. 29:1
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CORPORATE AGENTS
and supervision of its servants.' A servant, however, will lack ade-
quate incentives to exercise care without the possibility that he or she
will be liable for his or her torts either to the injured party or to the
corporate master on an indemnity claim.5 The liability of the servant
is particularly important since generally it is less expensive for him or
her to reduce the risk of accident by exercising additional care than it
is for the employer to reduce the risk through additional supervision,
training, and discipline.
In the criminal area, it is not clear that criminal fines imposed
upon a corporation adequately deter corporate agents from engaging
in criminal behavior on behalf of the corporation. In some cases the
actual cost of the fine may be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices, to employees in the form of lower wages, or to share-
holders in the form of lower dividends.' To actually deter corporate
criminal behavior, it may be necessary to impose criminal sanctions on
the actual arms and legs of the corporation, the corporate agents.
This article surveys the potential contractual, tort, criminal, and
statutory liabilities that a corporate agent may incur as a result of his
or her actions on behalf of the corporation. This discussion will show
that the question of the liability of a corporate agent for a particular
act must be considered separately from the question of whether his or
her act imposes liability on the corporation. In some cases only the
corporation is liable as a result of the agent's actions. In other cases
only the agent is liable, and in still others both are liable. Full appreci-
ation of rules of law governing the liability of a corporate agent can
assist an attorney in deciding in a particular situation whether to pur-
sue the agent, or in counselling the corporate agent regarding his or
her risk of personal liability.
4. See Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE Li. 105, 114 (1916). "If
we allow the master to be careless of his servant's torts we lose hold upon the most valuable
check in the conduct of social life." Id. Thus, the vicarious liability of a corporate master for the
torts of its servants has "managerial as well as financial functions." C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enter-
prise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE LJ. 554
(1961) (citing William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE Li.
584, 720 (1929)).
5. See generally, infra part V.E.
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick". an Unscandalized In-
quiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcu. L. REv. 386, 400-02 (1981).
1993]
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II. AUTHORIZED CoNTRAcrs FOR FULLY DISCLOSED
CORPORATE PRINCIPAL
A corporate agent who makes a contract on behalf of a corpora-
tion within his or her authority is not liable on the contract if he or she
clearly discloses the identity of the corporate principal to the other
party.7 The corporate agent incurs no liability because it was clear to
the party with whom the agent dealt that the agent was acting solely in
a representative capacity.' Therefore, if the party is able to hold the
corporation liable on the transaction, he or she receives everything for
which he or she bargained and has no grounds for complaint. Of
course, if the corporate agent makes fraudulent misrepresentations to
induce the third party to enter into the contract, the agent is liable for
his or her tortious behavior.9
III. UNAUTHORIZED CoNTRAcrs
Where a person who has no power to bind the corporation pur-
ports to contract on its behalf, that individual is personally liable to
the other party under a theory of implied warranty of authority. Per-
sonal liability will also be found where the person contracted in excess
of his or her authority.'0 The person is liable even though he or she
makes no express representation regarding the extent of his or her
authority to bind the corporation. The warranty is implied from the
act of purporting to act for the corporation." Furthermore, the per-
son is liable even if he or she acts in good faith and with an honest
belief that his or her action is authorized."2
If the party with whom a purported agent deals knows or should
know that the purported agent is not authorized to act, or if the pur-
ported agent disclaims any warranty of authority, the purported agent
is not liable on the warranty of authority. For example, if a contract
expressly requires the approval of another person or of the corporate
board of directors, then the agent is not liable to the other party upon
a warranty of authority.13
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958).
8. Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 76 A.2d 566, 570-71 (Md. 1950) (finding that plaintiffs may
sue the corporation for specific performance where the officers who signed the contracts acted
solely for the corporation).
9. See infra part VII. A.
10. CAL. CrV. CODE § 2342 (West 1985); Husky Indus. v. Craig Indus., 618 S.W2d 458,461
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); R=STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 (1958).
11. Husky, 618 S.W.2d at 461; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 329 cmt. a (1958).
12. Husky, 618 S.W.2d at 461; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 cmt. b (1958).
13. See, e.g., Yoakum v. Tarver, 64 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (finding that the
[Vol. 29:1
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The third person may recover not only damages for the harm re-
sulting to him or her from the purported agent's lack of authority, but
also may recover the benefit that he or she would have received from
the transaction if it had been authorized.14 The third person is not
damaged, however, by the lack of authority where the third person
would not have benefitted from the contract even if the purported
agent had been authorized. Thus, the third person is not damaged by
the lack of authority where the contract is unenforceable because of
the Statute of Frauds, where the corporation is insolvent, or where
performance under the contract would be excused because of super-
vening impossibility, commercial frustration, or illegality. 5
A person who tortiously misrepresents that he or she has author-
ity to bind a corporation is subject to tort liability to the other party to
the transaction.' 6 The other party may recover for any loss caused by
reliance upon the tortious misrepresentation. The purported agent is
not liable if the other person knows that he or she is without authority
to bind the corporation.' 7 "In practice, because of differing statutes of
limitations or rules of damages, because of auxiliary remedies allowed
for fraud, or because actions for fraud are not barred by bankruptcy, it
may be advantageous to bring an action of tort."'"
Generally, the liability of an unauthorized person is either upon a
warranty of authority or for tortious misrepresentation, but not as a
party to the contract. California, however, provides by statute that a
person without authority who enters into a written contract in the
principal's name without a good faith belief that he or she is author-
ized is responsible to the third person as a principal.' 9 Where its re-
quirements are met, this statutory provision makes the agent a party
to the contract. Similarly, under the Uniform Commercial Code a
person without authority who signs a negotiable instrument in the
name of another becomes liable on the instrument to any person who
defendant could not deliver title to corporate real estate without participation of another inves-
tor or officer); Balzebre v. Pearson, 273 So.2d 427,428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (concerning a
letter of first refusal signed by corporate secretary as an individual where the plaintiff had
knowledge that the title to real estate was held by the corporation). See also REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 cmt. g (1958).
14. Frst Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., 576 F.2d 479,490 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(citing REsTATEmENT (SEcoNrD) OF AGENCY § 329 cmt. j (1958)).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 cmt. j (1958); see also Graie Square Realty
Corp. v. Choice Realty Corp., 113 N.E.2d 416, 421 (N.Y. 1953) (finding the agreement unen-
forceable under the Statute of Frauds).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 330 (1958).
17. Id. at cmt. b.
18. Id. at cmt. c.
19. CAL Civ. CODE § 2343 (West 1985).
1993]
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in good faith and for value either takes or pays the instrument. 20 This
liability is not for damages for breach of a warranty of authority, but
instead is liability on the instrument itself.21 In sum, depending upon
the circumstances, a person who without authority enters a contract
purportedly on behalf of a corporation may be held liable under either
the implied warranty of authority, for tortious misrepresentation, or as
a party to the contract.
Ratification of an unauthorized transaction by the corporation
terminates a purported agent's liability for breach of warranty of au-
thority or for tortious misrepresentation.22 Ratification generally has
the same effect as if the transaction had been originally authorized
and, consequently, destroys any cause of action the third person had
against the purported agent based upon the lack of power to bind the
corporation.P If, however, the third person withdraws from the trans-
action by, for example, giving appropriate notice to either the corpo-
ration or the purported agent or by bringing suit against the agent for
breach of the warranty of authority, the corporation cannot then ratify
the transaction.24
Finally, where it is unclear whether the corporate agent was au-
thorized, the plaintiff may join the corporation and its agent in the
same suit. 5 Joinder should avoid the possibility of inconsistent ver-
dicts in separate actions against the corporation and its agent.
IV. FAmulm To DIscLosE AGENCY
A. In General
An authorized corporate officer or agent who contracts in his or
her own name without fully disclosing his or her agency status is per-
sonally liable on the contract.2 6 In order to avoid liability as a party to
the contract, the agent must disclose both the fact of his or her agency
and the identity of his or her corporate principal.27 The agent is not
20. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (1977).
21. Id. at cmt. 2. The signer is not liable to anyone who takes or pays the instrument
knowing of the lack of authority. Id.
22. Henry W. Savage, Inc. v. Friedberg, 77 N.E.2d 213, 215-16 (Mass. 1948). The court
added that when the defendant's principal ratified the agreement, "The plaintiff got what it had
originally bargained for and what the defendant did caused it no harm." Id. See also RESTATE.
MiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 338 (1958).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 100, 338 cmt. a (1958).
24. Id. §§ 88 cmt. a, 338 cmt. a.
25. See FED. R. Crv. P. 22 (referring to permissive poinder of parties).
26. Murphy v. Dell Corp., 440 A.2d 223 (Conn. 1981) (per curiam); RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF AGENCY § 322 (1958).
27. Jensen v. Alaska Valuation Serv. Inc., 688 P.2d 161, 163 (Alaska 1984).
[Vol. 29:1
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/1
CORPORATE AGENTS
relieved from liability on the contract by revealing that he or she is an
agent while failing to reveal the identity of the corporate principal. 8
A person dealing with an agent is not required to ask whether the
agent is acting for another.29 To avoid liability the agent must dis-
close his or her agency status and the identity of the corporate princi-
pal before entering into the contract. Disclosure after the contract is
formed does not relieve the agent of liability.30 Where there are mul-
tiple deliveries on credit and each delivery is determined to be a sepa-
rate contract, the extent of the agent's liability will depend upon the
point at which the agent first disclosed the identity of his or her corpo-
rate principal. The agent will be personally liable on contracts before
disclosure, but only the corporation will be liable on contracts after
disclosure.3'
The. question of whether the agent fully disclosed his or her cor-
porate principal prior to the formation of the contract is one of fact.
Therefore, it is the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence
and judge the credibility of witnesses on the issue.32 Unless the trial
court's decision is clearly erroneous, it will be upheld on appeal.33
A third person attempting to hold a corporate agent personally
liable on a contract has the burden of proving that the agent is a party
to the contract. Once this burden is satisfied, the agent has the burden
of establishing that he or she contracted on behalf of a fully disclosed
corporate principal.34 To meet his or her burden of proof, the agent
must establish that the other party knew, had reason to know, or was
28. Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 704 P.2d 974, 975 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). The court stated
that, "[U]nless otherwise agreed, a person purporting to make a contract with another for a
partially disclosed principal is a party to the contract." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENcY § 321 (1958).
29. Zolan, Bernstein, Dworken & Klein v. Milone, 467 A.2d 938, 939 (Conn. App. Ct.
1983).
30. American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 472 A.2d 872, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (remanding the case for
resolution of fact questions of whether defendant was a corporate agent and, if so, whether
timely disclosure of agency was made); Como v. Rhines, 645 P.2d 948, 953 (Mont. 1982) (holding
that disclosure by agent during litigation did not relieve agent from liability).
31. Rosenthal v. National Produce Co., Inc., 573 A.2d 365, 370-71 (D.C. 1990).
32. Jensen v. Alaska Valuation Serv. Inc., 688 P.2d 161, 164 (Alaska 1984); New England
Whalers Hockey Club v. Nair, 474 A.2d 810, 813 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984).
33. Jensen, 688 P.2d at 164; Murphy v. Dell Corp., 440 A.2d 223, 224 (Conn. 1981)(per
curiam). See also FED R. Civ. P. 52(a).
34. Mahan v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 677 P.2d 301, 304-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). The
court explained that after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a contract with the de-
fendant, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove both the existence and timely disclosure of
the agency relationship. Id.
1993]
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given notification of the existence and identity of the corporate princi-
pal prior to contracting.35 The agent does not meet his or her burden
of proof by merely proving that a corporate principal exists.36 In addi-
tion, proof that the agent used a trade name of the corporation in
contracting with another party or that the agent paid by corporate
check is generally insufficient, by itself, to establish full disclosure of
the agency relationship.37
Facts that tend to show that the other party had notice of the
existence and identity of the corporate principal include: (1) the agent
signed the contract in a representative capacity, such as "Acme, Corp.,
by John Doe, President;' '38 (2) the name of the principal is disclosed in
the contract, even if the contract is in the name of the agent;39 (3)
corporate checks were used in dealings between the parties prior to
the time of the transaction in question, particularly where the prior
course of dealing was extensive and corporate checks were consist-
ently used;40 (4) the other party had knowledge of the existence of the
corporation and the fact that the agent has a relationship with it, even
if the position of the agent within the corporation is not known;41 (5)
the business between the parties was transacted in corporate offices;
42
and (6) the other party had knowledge that the subject matter of the
transaction belonged to the corporation, particularly where the nature
35. David v. Shippy, 684 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF AGENCY § 4 cmt. a (1958)).
36. David, 684 S.W.2d at 588 (finding that licenses issued to the corporation were not
enough to discharge the agent's duty to disclose the principal).
37. See, e.g., Conn. Limousine Serv. v. Powers, 508 A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that payment by corporate check is not sufficient notice that tickets were purchased on
behalf of the corporation); New England Whalers Hockey Club v. Nair, 474 A.2d 810, 814
(Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (using a corporate trade name is not sufficient to disclose a principal);
Hill & Co. v. O'Malley, 817 P.2d 660 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (paying by corporate check); Como v.
Rhines, 645 P.2d 948, 952 (Mont. 1982) (using a corporate trade name); Biron v. Abare, 522
A.2d 230, 231 (Vt. 1987) (using a corporate trade name).
38. A.S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 288 A.2d 596, 598 (Md. 1972).
39. Cf. Bidwell v. Jolly, 716 P.2d 481, 483 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that every docu-
ment related to transaction bore the name of the corporation).
40. See, e.g., id.; Potter v. Chaney, 290 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ky. 1956) (illustrating that checks
given in payment over a period of nearly four years were sufficient to disclose corporate exist-
ence and identity).
41. Vernon D. Cox & Co. v. Giles, 406 A.2d 1107,1109-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (involving a
plaintiff who was aware that the defendant was associated with the corporation, although una-
ware that the defendant was the chairman of the board); A.S. Abell, 288 A.2d at 598 (finding that
plaintiff was aware that the defendant was at least an officer and maybe president of the
corporation).
42. See Potter, 290 S.W.2d at 46 (involving party who came to corporate offices on numer-
ous occasions to see about or to get checks).
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of the transaction suggested that its purpose was to benefit the
corporation.43
Factors tending to show a lack of notice of the existence and iden-
tity of the corporate principal include: (1) the contract was signed by
the agent without reference to the corporate name or the agent's rep-
resentative capacity;" (2) documents such as quotes, invoices, delivery
tickets, etc. are signed in the agent's name and/or mailed to the agent,
particularly if sent to the agent's home address;45 (3) testimony that
the agent failed to advise the other party that he or she was acting on
behalf of a corporation;46 (4) evidence that the corporation was not a
party to the negotiations or that the negotiations occurred at the
agent's home;47 and (5) testimony that the agent was asked to sign
individually and/or a signature or contractual language indicating an
intent to be bound individually, such as "John Doe, individually". 48
The issue of whether a corporate agent fully disclosed his or her
corporate principal very often arises in situations where the third per-
son agrees to extend credit on a continuing basis to a sole proprietor-
ship which is subsequently incorporated. When the corporation
becomes insolvent, the former proprietor attempts to avoid liability by
claiming that the debt is that of the corporation. A significant number
of cases have held that personal liability may be imposed upon the
former proprietor where he or she did not adequately disclose to the
other party that he or she had begun acting as a representative of the
43. See, eg., Vernon D. Cox, 406 A.2d at 1110 (concerning a plaintiff who knew that the
corporation owned the land to be appraised and that the purpose of the appraisal was to enable
the corporation to refinance).
44. See, eg., Zella Wahnon & Assoc. v. Bassman, 398 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Douglas v. O'Connell, 429 A.2d 1310, 1311 (Vt. 1981) (signing "Timothy J. O'Connell Top of
Square" did not "style [signor] as an agent").
45. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Equip. Co. v. Granahan, 409 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (involving an agent who signed a quotation and invoice personally, and they were mailed
to his home address which was also the address of the corporation); Mahan v. First Nat'l Bank,
677 P.2d 301, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (concerning delivery tickets and billing statements that
were made out in agent's name and the billing statements were sent to the agent).
46. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Equip., 409 F. Supp. at 1014 (involving testimony by the other
party to the contract that the agent never disclosed he was acting as agent for a corporation, and
the agent did not testify that he had made such a disclosure).
47. Brown v. Owen Litho Serv. Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (involving
meetings which took place at the agent's house); Ristvedt v. Nettum, 311 N.W.2d 574,577 (N.D.
1981) (finding that the corporation was not a party to the negotiations).
48. See, e.g., Beck v. Haines Terminal and Highway Co., Inc., 843 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992)
(involving language of a personal guarantee); Ristvedt, 311 N.W.2d at 577 (involving testimony
that the agent was asked to sign individually). Cf. Bank of N.M. v. Priestley, 624 P.2d 511, 514-
15 (N.M. 1981) (finding it "obvious" that two agents who signed "Joe W. Priestley, individually"
and "Charles E. Nuckols, individually," with one signing in a respresentative capacity, were per-
sonally liable on the contract).
1993]
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corporation.49 These cases recognize that, "[a]s a matter of public pol-
icy and commercial reality, a trade creditor should not be burdened
with the duty of continually monitoring its customers' business
organization."50
A corporate agent who is liable as a party to a contract has avail-
able any defense that arises out of the transaction as well as any de-
fenses personal to the agent.5 1 Defenses arising out of the transaction
include any defense that the corporation could have raised if it had
been sued by the third person, including such defenses as fraud, mis-
representation, breach of condition, and nonperformance. Personal
defenses of the agent would include infancy or a right of set-off result-
ing from a separate transaction. 2
B. Election Rule vs. Satisfaction Rule
A person who contracts with an agent for an undisclosed corpo-
rate principal may join both the agent and the corporate principal in a
suit upon the contract if the person discovers the existence and iden-
tity of the corporate principal prior to bringing suit.5 3 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency provides that the plaintiff must elect
whether to hold the principal or the agent liable if either the principal
or the agent objects and demands an election. 4 Where neither the
principal nor the agent demands an election, a number of cases hold
that the right to demand an election is waived and judgment may be
entered against both defendants. 5
The election requirement is arguably justified on the ground that
a person who contracts with the agent of an undisclosed principal is
given an advantage not contemplated at the time of the contract by
49. See, eg., Hill v. O'Malley, 817 P.2d 660, 662-64 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that pay-
ment by corporate check alone is insufficient notice of agency where defendant signed invoices
without any corporate indication and all billings were mailed to defendant individually).
50. Id. at 664 (quoting Taylor Oil Co. v. Giordano, 509 A.2d 269, 273 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986)).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 334 (1958). Defenses personal to the corpora-
tion, however, are not available to the agent. Id. See also O'Conner v. Hancock, 604 A.2d 565,
566 (N.H. 1992) (mem.) (involving a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction).
52. See R-sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 334 cmt. a (1958).
53. Id. § 210A.
54. Id.
55. Amortibanc Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rampart Associated Management, Inc., 627 P.2d 389, 393
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Hoyt v. Horst, 201 A.2d 118, 123-24 (N.H. 1964).
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being permitted to sue the principal. Discharging the agent from lia-
bility where the person elects to hold the corporate principal liable
merely places the parties in the same position as if the agent had dis-
closed the identity of the corporate principal.56
The election requirement is heavily criticized57 and a growing
number of cases reject it.5 8 These cases permit a party who contracts
with the agent of an undisclosed principal to proceed to judgment
against both the agent and the principal, although limiting the party to
only one satisfaction.59 These cases recognize that the agent should be
liable because he or she contracted in his or her name and that the
principal should be liable because the contract is made for the princi-
pal's benefit.6" In addition, the satisfaction rule removes a potential
trap for persons suing both the agent and the principal. Under the
election rule, a summary or default judgment against one defendant
discharges the liability of the other defendant. Such a discharge can
"leave the creditor with but one possibly uncollectible judgment... 61
Under the Restatement (Second) Agency, the corporation is dis-
charged from liability where the plaintiff recovers judgment against
the agent for breach of contract after acquiring knowledge of the
existence and identity of the corporate principal. 2 The corporation is
not discharged, however, where the judgment is recovered against the
agent before the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the existence and
identity of the corporate principal. 63
56. Tabloid Lithographers, Inc. v. Israel, 209 A.2d 364,368 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
But cf. Grinder v. Bryans Road Bldg. and Supply Co., 432 A.2d 453, 461-63 (Md. 1981) (listing
and criticizing justifications for the election requirement).
57. See Grinder, 432 A.2d at 461-63 (discussing views of commentators and concluding that
they "appear to be nearly unanimous in their support of the minority, ie., satisfaction rule.").
58. See, e.g., id. at 464; Engelstad v. Cargill, Inc. 336 N.W.2d 284,286 (Minn. 1983); Crown
Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 756 P.2d 717, 721 (Wash. 1988).
59. Grinder, 432 A.2d at 464; Engelstad, 336 N.W.2d at 286.
60. See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298, 300 (1875); Maurice H. Merrill, Election Between
Agent and Undisclosed Principak Shall We Follow the Restatement, 12 NEB. L. BuLL. 100, 122
(1933).
61. See, eg., Grinder, 432 A.2d at 464 (rejecting summary judgment entered against corpo-
ration and the election rule); cf. Tabloid Lithographers, Inc. v. Israel, 209 A.2d 364 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1965) (treating default judgment entered against corporation as election to dis-
charge agent).
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN r) OF AGENCY § 210(1) (1958). See also Wynne v. Adcock Pipe
and Supply, 761 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
63. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 210(2) (1958).
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C. Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Show Agency
Where a written contract is integrated 4 and is unambiguous as to
whether the agent is or is not a party to the contract, extrinsic evi-
dence is not admissible to show a contrary intent. For example, if the
contract is signed "Acme, Inc., by John Doe, President", extrinsic evi-
dence is not admissible to show that the agent is a party to the con-
tract.65 Conversely, if the contract describes the agent as a party or
includes a promise by the agent and is signed "Jane Doe, individually"
or "Jane Doe, acting for myself alone," extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible to show that the agent is not a party to the contract.66 Or,
where an integrated contract contains no reference to a corporation,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that a corporate officer or
agent who appears to be a party to the contract is not intended to be a
party.67
Where an integrated contract reveals the fact of agency but is am-
biguous regarding whether the parties intended to make the agent a
party, extrinsic evidence dealing with the intention of the parties is
admissible. For example, if the contract includes the name of the cor-
poration and is signed by the agent or is signed "John Doe, agent",
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show whether the parties intended
the agent to be a party to the contract.68
D. Disclosing Agency in a Written Contract
As discussed above, a corporate agent must disclose both the fact
of his or her agency and the identity of the corporate principal in or-
der to avoid personal liability on contracts made on behalf of the cor-
poration.69 While in some circumstances it is important that the
64. An agreement is integrated where it constitutes a final and exclusive written expression
of agreement on one or more terms. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAC's § 209(1) (1981).
65. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 323(1) illus. 2 (1958).
66. Id. § 323(1), ill. 1.
67. World Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 N.E.2d 518, 520-22 (Ill. Ct. App. 1975). The court found
that the trial court improperly admitted parol evidence that purported agent signed in a repre-
sentative capacity. The contract described Alex Smith as a party and was signed "Alex Smith."
Id. See also RESTATEmNT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 323(3) (1958); U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(a) (1991).
68. Charles Selon & Assoc. v. Estate of Aisenberg, 431 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (I11. App. Ct.
1981). Where a document contained the name of the corporation and was signed by the agent,
but did not contain reference to an agency relationship, the ambiguity justified admission of
extrinsic evidence to determine the capacity in which the parties intended the agent to sign. Id.
See also Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Chasco Supply Co., 281 A.2d 765,766-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (find-
ing that document entitled "personal guaranty" where signatures were followed by corporate
titles was ambiguous and therefore a question of fact for the jury).
69. See infra part IV.A.
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corporate principal remain undisclosed, where disclosure is not an is-
sue a corporate agent can insure that he or she is not personally liable
on an authorized written contract by following some simple rules.
First, the contract should describe the corporation and not the
agent as the party to the contract. Second, promises in the contract
should be phrased as promises of the corporation and not of the agent.
Third, the contract should use the name of the corporation as it is set
out in its articles of incorporation and not merely a trade name of the
corporation. Regardless of the degree of similarity between the two
names, if a corporation uses its trade name, a court may decide that
the identity of the corporate principal was not adequately disclosed.
Fourth, the contract should use the entire name of the corporation
including "Incorporated", "Corporation", "Inc.", "Corp.", etc. With-
out a reference to such a word or abbreviation, the name does not by
itself give notice that the business is being carried on as a corporation
as opposed to a sole proprietorship or a partnership. 70
Fifth, the agent should execute the contract in a manner that indi-
cates that the corporation is the party and that the agent is signing in a
representative capacity. Styling the signature "Acme, Inc., by Jane
Doe, President" or "Acme, Inc., by Jane Doe, Agent" is the most ef-
fective manner of doing this.71 Finally, the agent should not sign the
contract both in a representative capacity and in an individual capac-
ity unless he or she intends to be personally bound. An agent for a
disclosed corporate principal may agree to be a party to a contract he
or she makes on behalf of the corporation.72 If the contract is signed:
Acme, Inc., by John Doe, President
John Doe.
then, the individual signature is superfluous to the execution of the
contract in a representative capacity, and is likely to be viewed as evi-
dence of an intention to bind the agent personally.73
70. See, e.g., David v. Shippy, 684 SAV.2d 586, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
although the corporate name was "Captain W. T. Walkers, Inc.," contract referred to "Captain
W. T. Walkers"); African Bio-Botanica, Inc. v. Leiner, 624 A.2d 1003,1004 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (concerning checks and letterhead which carried the name "Ecco Bella," but corpo-
rate name was "Ecco Bella Incorporated").
71. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3 (referring to negotiable instruments, "Peter Pringle by Arthur
Adams, Agent" is the "unambiguous way to make the representation clear").
72. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 320 cmt. e (1958). "Ordinarily, if the agent
is a co-promisor, he is in effect a surety, and the principal is primarily liable." Id. See also Bank
of New Mex. v. Priestley, 624 P.2d 511, 514-15 (N.M. 1981) (holding agent who signed contract
and promissory note once in his representative capacity as corporate president and a second
time in the form "Joe V. Priestley, individually" was bound by both contract and note).
73. Cf. Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Schmidt, 316 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (Neb. 1982) (dealing
with signatures on a promissory note).
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V. ULTRA VRES CoNTRAcrs
Absent special circumstances, a corporate agent who enters into
an ultra vires contract74 on behalf of a corporation is not liable to the
other party to the contract for the corporation's failure to perform.75
While a corporate agent usually impliedly warrants his or her author-
ity to bind the corporation,76 the agent generally does not warrant that
the corporation has capacity to make a particular contract.77
If a corporate agent has reason to know that an act is ultra vires
and that the other person is ignorant of that fact, he or she might be
liable to the other party for the corporation's failure to perform?81 For
example, a comment to the Restatement (Second) of Agency suggests
that an agent who contracts on behalf of a foreign corporation whose
powers are not ordinarily known to the other party, but which should
be known to the agent, may have a duty to disclose the corporation's
lack of full contractual capacity.7 9 However, because of the common
practice of using broad purposes clauses 0 and because of the broad
statutory powers conferred by modem corporation statutes,81 the ac-
tions of corporate agents will only rarely be outside the powers of the
corporation and, hence, ultra vires. In addition, modem corporation
statutes restrict the use of the ultra vires doctrine. Generally, a corpo-
ration itself may not raise the issue of ultra vires as a grounds for chal-
lenging the validity of a corporate action. Consequently, a third
person is unlikely to suffer damages as a result of entering an ultra
vires contract with a corporate agent.82
74. An ultra vires contract is one not within the express or implied powers of a corporation.
See FLETCHER CYc. CORP. § 3399 (Per. Ed. 1989).
75. Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 446 P.2d 934,936-37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 332 (1958).
76. See supra part HI.
77. Jenkins v. City of Henderson, 199 S.E. 37,39 (N.C. 1938) (dealing with municipal corpo-
ration); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 332 cmt. a (1958).
78. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 332 cmt. b (1958).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (1991) (permitting the certificate of incor-
poration to state that "the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity
for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware").
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act does not even require a purpose clause in the
articles of incorporation. § 2.02 (1984). Under the Revised Model Act, "a corporation formed
without reference to a purpose clause will automatically have the purpose of engaging in any
lawful business." MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 2.02 cmt. (3rd ed. 1993).
81. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINEss CORP. Acr. § 3.02
(1984).









A corporate agent who commits a tort is personally liable to third
persons who are injured as a result. For example, a corporate agent is
liable when his or her negligence creates an unreasonable risk of harm
to others, 3 for participation in a tortious conversion,' for trespass,8
for misrepresentation,8 6 for common law unfair competition,87 and for
other types of tortious conduct. The agent is not relieved of liability
by the fact that his or her agency is disclosed, that the act is done on
behalf of the corporation, or that the corporation is also liable.
88
A corporate agent generally is subject to liability only where he
or she participates in a tort. This participation requirement is met by;
(1) a tortious act personally committed by the agent;89 (2) the tortious
conduct of another which is directed by the agent, who intends either
a tortious act or consequence;90 (3) a failure to exercise reasonable
care in controlling another under the agent's control;91 (4) a failure to
exercise reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or cooperating with
other agents;92 (5) a failure to take reasonable precautions to protect
others from risks associated with chattels or real property subject to
83. Loeffler v. McShane, 539 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988), affg 49 Pa. D.&C.3d 120
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding against principal corporate officer and part owner of corporation
for negligent disbursement of funds from mortgage refinancing); RESTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 350 (1958).
84. Shonberger v. Oswell, 530 A.2d 112, 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (determining that trial
court erred in entering judgment in favor of corporate officer in conversion action); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 349 (1958).
85. Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (affirming trial court
judgment against general manager of corporation who ordered crews to cut timber from plain-
tiff's tract); RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 348A (1958).
86. Galie v. RAM Assoc. Management Serv., Inc., 757 P.2d 176, 177 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that trial court erred in dismissing misrepresentation claim against corporate agents);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1958).
87. A & M Records, Inc. v. M. V. C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978) (concluding
that district court erred in failing to hold corporate agent liable for record piracy).
88. Galie, 757 P.2d at 177; Wilson v. S. Cent. Miss. Farmers, Inc., 494 So.2d 358, 361 (Miss.
1986); Shonberger, 530 A.2d at 114; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
89. See St. James Constr. Co. v. Morlock, 597 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)
(involving a decision of a corporate president to use wood in constructing support for wall), cert.
denied 601 A.2d 1100 (Md. 1992); Amabile v. Auto Kleen Car Wash, 376 A.2d 247, 252 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977) (negligence of engineer in designing car wash); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 350 (1958).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 344 (1958).
91. See Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d 746,752-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (finding failure of
general manager to use reasonable care to prevent crews under his control from trespassing);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 351 (1958).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 358(1) (1958).
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the agent's control;93 or (6) a failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect the person or property of another whom the agent has a duty
to protect, where the other relies upon the protection of the corporate
principal or the agent.94 Absent a co-employee immunity provision in
the applicable workers' compensation statute, a corporate agent is lia-
ble to co-employees to the same extent as to third persons.95
Some authority suggests that a corporate officer may be liable in
tort where he or she decides what course of action the corporation will
take. For example, in one case a jury found that a corporate chief
executive officer who decides that the corporation will not vacate
premises may be personally liable for damages.96
A corporate agent who does not participate in a tort is not liable,
however, simply because of his or her agency status.97 In addition,
absent special circumstances a corporate agent is not liable to a third
person for a breach of a duty the agent owes to the corporation.98 A
mere breach of the agent's contract with the corporation or fiduciary
duties to the corporation does not give rise to tort liability to a third
person. The agent is only liable when he or she harms another by
tortious conduct which constitutes the breach of an independent legal
obligation to that person. "In some 'cases, the harm is caused by the
93. See J. C. Penney Co. v. Barrientez, 411 P.2d 841, 849 (Okla. 1965) (holding that the
manager of a store had a duty of care towards invitees of the store); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 355 (1958).
94. See Craven v. Oggero, 213 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1973) The holding was superceded by
statute as stated in Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1981) (finding that trial
court improperly directed verdict on behalf of safety director and job superintendent arising out
of death of employee at work site).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359 (1958). Many states have enacted co-em-
ployee immunity provisions. See, e.g., CAL LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (1989) (stating that workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy of an injured employee except where injury caused by
"unprovoked physical act of aggression" or by intoxication of other employee); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 2363(a) (1985); N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW §§ 29(1), (6) (McKinney 1993). There
weight of authority is that co-employee immunity provisions are inapplicable to intentional torts,
although there is some authority to the contrary. See 2A ARTHUR LARSON, LAw OF VoRK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.21 (1993). Co-employee immunity provisions are inapplicable where
the co-employee is acting outside of the course of employment at the time he or she commits the
tort. Id. § 73.23.
96. Metromedia Co. v. WCBM Maryland, Inc., 610 A.2d 791, 794-95 (Md. 1992) (finding
that the trial court erred in directing judgment for the officer). Cf. also Camacho v. 1440 Rhode
Island Ave. Corp., 620 A.2d 242, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (involving a tort action by an evicted
tenant where the court held that the trial court erred in applying incorrect standards to corporate
chief executive officer who was primarily responsible for setting policies of the corporation and
making sure the policies were carried out).
97. See, e.g., Barker v. Crown Drug Co., 284 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. 1955) (holding that the
trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of a store manager who was not present at
the store when a bottle fell onto plaintiff's foot and who was merely relieving the regular man-
ager during the latter's vacation).
98. REsTATEmENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 352 (1958).
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fact that an agent does an act which causes the injury... In other cases
the harm is caused, not merely because the agent failed in his duty to
the principal, but because he improperly failed to perform acts, upon
the performance of which the injured person or the principal relied." 99
In civil cases, it is generally held that a purely intracorporate con-
spiracy cannot exist.10° The acts of corporate agents are usually
viewed as being acts of the corporation.10 1 Since it is legally impossi-
ble for a person to conspire with herself,102 the acts of the corporate
agents are generally held to be legally insufficient to establish a con-
spiracy" regardless of the number of agents who are involved. How-
ever, a conspiracy may be found where one of the corporate agents
acts in his or her individual capacity.' °4
B. Interference With A Contract or Prospective Contract
A party to a disadvantageous contract is generally able to aban-
don the contract and only incur liability for breach of contract. A
corporation, however, can only act through and upon the advice of its
agents. A corporation would be at a comparative disadvantage if it
could only abandon disadvantageous contracts at the risk of personal
liability of its agents for tortious interference with the contract.10 5
A corporate agent is not liable on a theory of tortious interfer-
ence with contract for the corporation's breach of contract where the
agent acts in good faith on behalf of the corporation within the scope
of the agent's official capacity."° This privilege protects actions taken
99. Id. § 352 cmt. a.
100. Rutherford v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding that the trial court properly dismissed a conspiracy claim).
101. Mehl v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. 239, 241 (N.D. IM. 1987).
102. Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225, 238 (W.D. Va. 1988);
Cedar Hills Properties Corp. v. Eastern Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
review denied, 589 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1991). "Conspiracy requires the combination of two or more
persons." Id.
103. Selman, 697 F. Supp. at 225; Cedar Hills, 575 So.2d at 676. But see Lawler Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Tarver, 492 So.2d 297, 306 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a corporation can conspire
with two or more of its agents).
104. Fojtik v. First Nat'l Bank, 752 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that trial
court erred in directing verdict for defendants on conspiracy claim), writ denied, 775 S.W.2d 633
(Tex. 1989); Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
issue of civil conspiracy should have been submitted to the jury).
105. Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (Or. 1968).
106. Sorrells v. Garfinckel's 565 A.2d 285, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that under the
facts of the case, privilege vitiated by malice); Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765
P.2d 619, 623-24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a director or officer is not liable if he is
acting within the scope of his official duties) cert. denied; Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 851 P.2d 946, 950 (Idaho 1993); Davenport v. Eppely, 744 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Wyo. 1987);
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 and cmt. b (1972).
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by the agent within the scope of his or her duties where the agent
intends to protect a corporate interest.1' 7 For example, a corporate
employee who recommends in his or her official capacity the dis-
charge of another employee is generally not liable for tortiously in-
ducing a breach of contract if the co-employee is discharged.10 8 The
privilege also extends to claims of tortious interference with prospec-
tive contracts where the cause of action is recognized.10 9
On the other hand, a corporate agent is liable for tortious inter-
ference with a contract where for personal or improper motives he or
she induces the corporation to breach its contract.110 If the corporate
agent's sole motive is to harass or to retaliate against another, the
agent's actions in inducing a breach of contract are tortious."' Addi-
tionally, a corporate agent is liable for tortious interference with con-
tract where he or she employs wrongful means in inducing the
corporation to breach a contract." 2 For example, fraudulent misrep-
resentations or threats of illegal conduct to induce the corporation to
breach a contract or to interfere with a prospective contract would
generally be considered wrongful." 3
Most corporate officers and employees have some personal inter-
est in the welfare of the corporation. Corporate officers and employ-
ees can benefit from a corporation's improved financial position as a
result of its breach of a disadvantageous contract. If an agent acts
with an intent to benefit the corporation, he or she is not liable simply
because the breach of contract also benefits him or her personally." 4
Since the issue of abuse of privilege is a question of fact, the
plaintiff will often be able to avoid summary judgment on the issue." 5
For example, where there is testimony that the defendant wanted to
get the plaintiff fired because the defendant didn't like to work with
107. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 770 cmt. b (1977).
108. See Davenport, 744 P.2d at 1114.
109. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 770 and cmt. a (1977). See also Turner v.
Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1115-17 (Kan. 1986) (involving communications to a prospective
employer).
110. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 767 cmt. d, 770 cmt. e (1977).
111. Zappa v. Seiver, 706 P.2d 440, 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a fact issue ex-
isted as to whether defendant's action "was motivated by improper personal reasons or by a
desire to serve the corporate interests."); Sorrels v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that the jury was properly instructed that the privilege is destroyed by malice).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 and cmt. d (1977).
113. See id. § 767 cmt. c.
114. Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606-07 (Or. 1968).
115. See Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Wash., 600 A.2d 813,820 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that whether a corporate agent acted with malice or for an improper purpose is a question of
fact; "summary judgment on the issue is rarely appropriate").
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him, a court may find that a genuine issue of material fact exists re-
garding whether the defendant acted solely out of improper mo-
tives.116  Further, the fact finder is permitted to infer from the
existence of an improper motive that it was the defendant's only
motive." 7
C. Defamation
In some circumstances a corporate agent may be liable for defa-
mation. A defamatory communication is actionable only if it is pub-
lished to a third party."' In some jurisdictions a defamatory intra-
corporate communication among officers or agents of a corporation
concerning the business of the corporation is not considered publica-
tion to a third person.1 9 Under this view an intra-corporate commu-
nication merely involves the corporation talking to itself; there is no
publication to a third person.120 The better view is that an intra-cor-
porate communication is publication to a third person, recognizing
that the communication is subject to a qualified privilege.' 2' This view
recognizes that "damage to one's reputation within a corporate com-
munity may be just as devastating as that effected by defamation
spread to the outside."'"
A defamatory communication is not actionable if it is privi-
leged.'23 In jurisdictions in which an intra-corporate statement consti-
tutes publication to a third person, the statement is conditionally
privileged where it is made to a party with a legitimate interest in the
subject matter, 24 or to a party with a common interest in the subject
116. Giordano v. Aerolift, Inc., 818 P.2d 950, 953 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
117. Id.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 558(b), 577 (1977).
119. See, e.g., Dixon v. Economy Co., 477 So.2d 353,354 (Ala. 1985) (holding that communi-
cation among managerial personnel about the corporation's business is not a publication); Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co. v. Melikyan, 424 So.2d 1114, 1115 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
memo to the home office stating that an employee was "not trustworthy" was not a publication);
Jones v. Golden Spike Corp., 623 P.2d 970, 971 (Nev. 1981) (holding that a statement to a group
of employees is not a publication).
120. See Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., 683 P.2d 1292,1293 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the
different views regarding intra-corporate communications), affd, 695 P.2d 1279 (Kan. 1985).
121. See, e.g., Brewer v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 150, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1980) (inter-
preting Kentucky law); Jones v. Britt Airways, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 389, 391-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Luttrell 683 P.2d at 1294; Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Minn. 1986);
RMSTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. i (1977).
122. Luttrell, 683 P.2d at 1294.
123. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 558(b) (1977). A number of privileges are recog-
nized as defenses to a defamation action. While some are absolute privileges, others are condi-
tional or qualified privileges. See generally id. §§ 583-612. D. Jan Duffy, Defamation and
Employer Privilege, 9 EMp. REL. J. 444 (1984).
124. RE:STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977).
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matter.12' Thus, communications between managerial personnel act-
ing within the scope of their duties regarding the reasons for dismissal
of an employee are generally held to be subject to a qualified privi-
lege. 126 A number of cases extend this privilege to a communication
of the reason for the dismissal to co-employees of the dismissed
worker. 27 Similarly, communications regarding employee conduct or
performance, or communications in the course of an investigation of
employee conduct, generally are subject to a qualified privilege. 28
A communication by a corporate agent to a person outside of the
corporation is subject to a qualified privilege where the person has a
legitimate interest in the subject matter 29 or where the communica-
tion is to a party who may act in the public interest.130 Thus, a com-
munication by an agent of a corporation to a prospective employer
regarding the performance or the reason for the termination of a for-
mer employee is subject to a qualified privilege.' 3 1 Additionally, a
125. Id. § 596.
126. See, e.g., Lawson v. Howmet Aluminum Corp., 449 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that a plant supervisor, plant manager and immediate supervisor had a common
interest in the reason for plaintiff's termination); Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140
(Minn. 1986) (discussing the distribution of a termination letter to two officers involved in the
decision-making process); DiBiasio v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 525 A.2d 489, 491 (R.I. 1987)
(discussing supervisory personnel present at a meeting where an employee was terminated).
127. See, e.g., Patane v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc., 708 P.2d 473, 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that the trial court erred in limiting the privilege to communications among managerial
personnel); Gordon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 A.D. 2d 850 (N.Y. App. Dov. 1979) (mem.) (holding
that other insurance agents had a common interest in the subject of reasons for terminating the
plaintiff).
128. See, e.g., Jones v. Britt Airways, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 389, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing
communications among several levels of employees during investigation of improper issuance of
tickets); Iurner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1114 (Kan. 1986) (discussing investigation of
possible theft of company tools by employee); Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., 683 P.2d 1292,1293-94
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing statement by managerial personnel that employee was illegally
taping telephone conversations), aff'd, 695 P.2d 1279 (1985); Zuniga v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
671 P.2d 662, 665 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing statements of store security personnel to
manager that employee had attempted to steal a television set), cert. denied, 671 P.2d 1150 (N.M.
1983).
129. Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 558, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that
statements made in meetings between the company, the employees, and the union are subject to
a qualified privilege; all had a legitimate interest in the subject of money shortage and em-
ployee's discharge), affd, 800 F.2d 1139 (3rd Cir. 1986); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORIS
§ 596 (1977).
130. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 598 (1977).
131. See, e.g., Riggs v. Cain, 406 So.2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Haldeman v.
Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98,103 (Iowa 1985); Turner, 722 P.2d at 1114 (Kan. 1986). Cf.
Shannon v. Taylor AMC/Jeep, Inc., 425 N.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Mich. App. 1988). A qualified
privilege is not applicable to communications to customers regarding the reason for termination
of a parts manager because the customers' interest is only curiosity. Id.
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communication by a corporate agent to law enforcement officials re-
garding a possible crime is subject to a qualified privilege.132
A communication subject to a qualified privilege is actionable
where the privilege is abused.' 33  A privilege may be abused in a
number of ways including: (1) publication of a statement with knowl-
edge that it is false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; 3 4 (2)
publication of a statement solely as an act of spite or ill will;135 (3)
publication of a communication that includes a statement going be-
yond what is necessary to protect the interest giving rise to the privi-
lege;1 36 or (4) excessive publication of a statement "to persons not
within the 'circle' of those people who have a legitimate and direct
interest in the subject matter of the communication.' 1 37
The question of whether a statement is subject to a qualified priv-
ilege is a question of law for the court.' 38 Where a corporate agent
relies upon the defense of privilege, he or she bears the burden of
proof as to the existence of the privilege.139 Where the court decides
that a defamatory communication is subject to a qualified privilege,
the question of whether the qualified privilege was abused is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. 4° The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
abuse of the privilege. 4'
Because the issue of abuse of privilege is a question of fact, the
132. Turner, 722 P.2d at 1115 (discussing communications initiated by the police during an
investigation).
133. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 (1977).
134. Jones v. Britt Airways, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding there was
sufficient evidence in the record to present a fact issue on the reckless disregard of the truth);
Riggs v. Cain, 406 So.2d 1202,1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). While communication of informa-
tion regarding a former employee to a prospective employer is subject to a qualified privilege,
the privilege does not protect a deliberate lie. Id. See also RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 600 (1977).
135. See DiBiasio v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 525 A.2d 489,492 (R.I. 1987) (holding that
evidence existed from which the jury could find malice); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§ 603 cmt. a (1977).
136. See Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the scope of statements did not exceed what was necessary); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF TORTS § 604 (1977).
137. See Garziano, 818 F.2d at 392, 395 (holding that a jury question existed as to whether a
qualified privilege was abused by excessive publication); RErSTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§ 604 (1977).
138. Lawson v. Howmet Aluminum Corp., 449 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
DiBiasio, 525 A.2d at 491; RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 619(1) (1977).
139. RESTATEMmrN (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. g (1977).
140. Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF TORTS § 619(2) (1977).
141. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 388; Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 144 (holding that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving malice); RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 613(h) (1977).
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plaintiff will often be able to avoid summary judgment on the issue.142
If the alleged defamatory statement is purportedly based upon per-
sonal knowledge, the plaintiff can often create a fact issue by denying
the facts and alleging that the agent knew the statement was false.143
Alternatively, the plaintiff can allege facts suggesting that the agent
was not acting for the benefit of the corporation, but rather out of ill
will towards the plaintiff. In many cases, a trial is necessary in order
to defeat a claim of abuse of privilege.
D. Joint and Several Nature of Agent's Liability
The liability of a corporate servant for a tort committed within
the scope of his or her employment is joint and several with the liabil-
ity of the corporate master under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The injured party may sue either the servant or the corporation, or
may join them both in one action and obtain judgment against both.1"
If the corporation and the servant are joined in the same action, judg-
ment in favor of one and against the other on the merits or judgments
for differing amounts of compensatory damages are improper in most
jurisdictions.145
If the injured party obtains a judgment against either the servant
or the corporation, he or she may still bring an action against the one
not joined in the first action unless the judgment has been satisfied.146
Absent special circumstances, however, the first judgment is conclu-
sive against the injured party in the second action on the amount of
compensatory damages. 147 Where the injured person sues only the
servant in the first action and judgment is for the servant, the person's
claim against the corporation under the theory of respondeat superior
142. See Lutz v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 586 A.2d 278,287 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1991). "[T]he gen-
eral rule is that one's intent, or state of mind, is a factual question which should not be decided
on summary judgment." Id.
143. See, eg., Lawson v. Boeing Co., 792 P.2d 545, 549-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the plaintiff's denial of accusations that he sexually harassed other employees created a fact
question regarding whether complaining employees abused the privilege by lying).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 217 B(1) (1958) (joinder of principal and
agent); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 882 cmt. b (1979). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 20
(permissive joinder of parties).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 B(2) (1958); R=STATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 882 cmt. d (1979) (noting that the amount of damages against each party must be the
same); id. § 883 cmt. b (discussing inconsistent verdicts on the issue of liability); see also Mis-
souri, Kan. and Tex. R.R. Co. v. Stanley, 372 P.2d 852, 855 (Okla. 1962) (reversing judgment
against the employer because the jury verdict was only against the railroad and the only theory
of employer liability was respondeat superior).
146. Goines v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 6 A.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
147. Id (discussing prior judgment against servants in the amount of one dollar each).
[Vol. 29:1
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is extinguished. 148 Similarly, if the injured person sues only the corpo-
ration in the first action, a judgment in favor of the corporation on a
respondeat superior claim extinguishes the person's claim against the
servant where the corporation concedes that the servant was acting
within the scope of employment at the time of the injury.149
A judgment against the servant or the corporation in the first ac-
tion generally is not preclusive against the other on the issures of lia-
bility and damages in a subsequent action since neither is ordinarily
representative of the other in the initial lawsuit.' 50 In the rare cases
where the servant, as indemnitor,151 assumes control of the action
brought against the corporation or is given the opportunity by the cor-
poration to defend the action, a judgment against the corporate
master may bind the servant in a subsequent suit by the corporation
against the servant for indemnity. 52 Absent special circumstances, 53
a servant would then be bound by the determination of issues in the
first action as though he or she were a party. 4 For example, the ser-
vant would be bound by determinations that he or she was negligent,
that the negligence occurred within the scope of his or her employ-
ment, and that such negligence caused an injury to the plaintiff.
E. Principal's Right to Indemnity
A corporation that is required to pay damages solely under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the tort of its servant is entitled to
indemnification from the servant. 5 5 The innocent master's right to
indemnity from the servant allows the entire cost of the accident to be
shifted to the servant, who is the lower-cost accident avoider. Under
modem rules of procedure, a corporation may make the servant a
party to an action in which the corporation is sued under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for the tortious act of the servant. 6
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51(1) (1982).
149. Davis v. Perryman, 286 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ark. 1956); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 51(1) (1982). Cf. Caldwell v. Kelly, 302 S.W.2d 815,816-17 (Tenn. 1957) (holding
that the trial court did not err in dismissing the suit against the servant even though the servant
did not appeal the order granting plaintiff a new trial).
150. See RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b (1982).
151. See infra part VLE.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1, 57 (1982).
153. Id. § 57(2).
154. Id. § 39.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 cmt. d (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 886B(2)(a) cmt. e (1979). See also Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Thmer, 488 P.2d
429 (Or. 1971) (reversing trial court decision that permitting recovery would be against public
policy in an action by insurer of a master against a servant for indemnity).
156. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 14.
1993]
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Sometimes a corporate master makes an insolvent servant a third
party defendant in an attempt to give the jury the false impression
that the servant will actually be called upon to pay the judgment or to
coerce the servant into testifying favorably to the corporation.157 In
this situation a court may order a separate trial of the third party claim
in order to avoid any prejudice to the plaintiff.15 8
An interesting question arises when a corporation is injured as a
result of the actions of two servants. Where the corporation sues one
of the servants, some cases hold that the negligence of the other ser-
vant is imputed to the corporation and deny recovery.1 59 The better
view is that the negligence of the other servant is not imputed to the
corporation. 60 The purpose for imputing the negligence of a servant
to the corporation, when the corporation is sued by a third person, is
not served by imputing the negligence of a servant to the corporation
when the corporation sues another negligent servant. 6 ' The corpora-
tion "should not be remediless against two negligent agents."' 62
Where the corporation is held liable because of negligence in hir-
ing, retaining, or instructing the agent or on a theory of negligent en-
trustment,163 the corporation does not have a right to indemnity as an
innocent party who is only vicariously liable. In jurisdictions that fol-
low the active/passive (or primary/secondary) negligence distinction,
however, the corporation may have a right of indemnity against the
servant as the active or primary tortfeasor. 64
157. See List v. Roto-Broil Corp. of Am., 40 F.R.D. 31 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Goodhart v. United
States Lines Co., 26 F.R.D. 163, 164 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). "[T]aking judicial notice of the fact that
the operator of a hi-lo will not be financially able to indemnify defendant to any substantial
extent" and refusing to help defendant "threaten the hi-lo operator with the necessity of going
through bankruptcy unless he testifies favorably to defendant." Id.
158. FEtD. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See also Lankford v. Ryder Truck Sys., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 430, 432
(D.S.C. 1967) (dictum) (denying motion to dismiss a third party complaint); Smith v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dictum).
159. See, eg., Capitola v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R.R. Co., 103 N.W.2d 867,
869 (Minn. 1960).
160. See Oxford Shipping Co. v. New Hampshire Trading Corp., 697 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.
1982); Brown v. Poritzky, 283 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. 1972); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C.
Greene & Co., 348 S.E.2d 617, 625-26 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
161. South Carolina Ins. Co., 348 S.E.2d at 625-26 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). "The purpose of
imputed liability is to provide an effective remedy for the person injured by the servant's negli-
gence.... Its purpose is not to let a negligent party evade responsibility for his wrongdoing."
Id.
162. Brown, 283 N.E.2d at 754 (N.Y. 1972).
163. See REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
164. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at
343 (5th ed. 1984). In jurisdictions that have abolished complete indemnity based upon the ac-
tive/passive negligence distinction in favor of a comparative negligence approach, the corporate
master may be entitled to comparative partial indemnity. Id. See generally Schneider Nat'l, Inc.
[Vol. 29:1
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VII. CRNnNAL ACrs
A. In General
A corporate agent is criminally liable for conduct that he or she
performs or causes to be performed in the name of the corporation to
the same extent as if the conduct was in his or her own name or on his
or her own behalf.'65 Thus, when a corporate agent commits a crime
on behalf of the corporation, he or she is not shielded from prosecu-
tion by the existence of the corporation. 166
A corporate agent may be convicted not only for acts that he or
she personally commits, 1" but also for criminal conduct authorized or
directed by the agent. A corporate employee who directs other em-
ployees to make false entries in records or to submit false claims in
violation of the law is subject to criminal liability.'6 Further, a corpo-
rate officer who sets corporate policies and practices which he or she
understands are in violation of the law is subject to criminal liability
despite the fact the policy is dictated through phone calls and occa-
sional visits to the corporate premises rather than through day-to-day
supervision of corporate activities. 69
In addition, a corporate agent who assists another in the commis-
sion of a crime is criminally liable.170 Generally mere presence at the
scene of a crime or knowledge that a crime is being committed is in-
sufficient to establish criminal liability.17 ' "To be liable... one must
associate himself with the venture, participate in it as something he
wishes to bring about, and through his action seek to make it suc-
ceed."'1 72 Finally, a developing area involves the potential liability of
corporate officers or managers for homicide where they are aware of
v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 576-79 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that equitable indemnity is to
be allocated on the basis of the comparative degree of fault).
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(6)(a) (1985); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 20.25 (McKinney
1987).
166. State v. Picheco, 203 A.2d 242, 244 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964); State v. Hill, 333 S.E.2d 789,
790 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1945) (holding that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally sold whiskey at a price in excess of lawful maximum
price).
168. See United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434 (2nd Cir. 1978)
(discussing false claims); Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1956) (discussing false
entries).
169. United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 239-41 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding
that a defendant in Nebraska was not insulated from liability for transactions carried out in
Colorado pursuant to his instructions).
170. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985).
171. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 378 A.2d 393, 398 (Pa. 1977).
172. KATHLEEN F. Bmic-EY, CORORAT'E CRIMINAL LmnrrY § 5:09 at 116 (1984).
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serious hazards to the safety of employees or customers and fail to
take corrective action.173
B. The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Under limited circumstances a corporate officer may be held lia-
ble without any awareness of wrongdoing or any personal participa-
tion in the act that is criminal. Congress and state legislatures have
adopted a number of statutes that are aimed at protecting the public
from dangers that members of the public are unable to protect them-
selves against. For example, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act' 74 was
adopted to protect the public against impure and adulterated food and
drugs. Under that Act, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a
company president and general manager in United States v. Dot-
terweich.'7 The company shipped misbranded and adulterated drugs
in interstate commerce. The Court found the president and manager
stood in a "responsible relation to a public danger. 1 76 The Court
therefore placed a duty on persons standing in a responsible relation
to the transaction to inform themselves of the existence of the condi-
tions imposed for the protection of the public.' 77
In the subsequent case of United States v. Park,' involving a cor-
porate chief executive officer convicted on violations of the Act, the
Supreme Court defined responsible relation in terms of the "power to
prevent the act complained of.' 1 7 9 Thus, a corporate agent stands in a
responsible relation to a transaction if he or she has the power to pre-
vent the criminal act. The Court, however, made clear that persons in
a responsible relation have not only the duty to seek out and remedy
violations when they occur, but also "a duty to implement measures
173. See generally Peter T. Edelman, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide:
The Need to Punish Both the Corporate Entity and its Officer, 92 DIcK. L. REV. 193 (1987);
Sharon R. Weinfield, Recent Development, Criminal Liability of Corporate Managers for Deaths
of their Employees: "People v. Warner-Lambert Co.," 46 ALB. L. REV. 655 (1982). The Califor-
nia Corporate Criminal Liability Act of 1989 imposes criminal liability on both corporations and
corporate managers for certain failures to report concealed dangers to the appropriate state
agency or to warn employees of these dangers. CAL PEN. CODE § 387 (West 1993 Supp.). In
Illinois, two former managers of a defunct corporation recently pleaded guilty to involuntary
manslaughter in order to avoid retrial for murder in the death of an employee from exposure to
cyanide. EDWARD FELSENTHAL, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,1993, B2, Col. 6, (S.W. ed). The managers
had been convicted of murder in a 1985 trial, but the convictions were overturned on appeal.
People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (II. 1990).
174. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938)
175. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
176. Id. at 281.
177. Id. at 285.
178. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
179. Id. at 671.
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that will insure that violations will not occur." ' The Court stated the
Act did not require the corporate agent to do anything objectively
impossible. Therefore, the agent is not liable if he or she is powerless
to prevent or correct the violation.18 '
The conviction of Park was upheld even though he testified that
he had relied upon his subordinates to remedy the problem. 82 Thus,
the case makes clear that delegation of authority to subordinates does
not provide an iron-clad defense to criminal liability for a public wel-
fare offense. In Park, the corporation involved had 36,000 employees,
874 retail outlets, and 16 warehouses. 3 While the case leaves open
the possibility that the defense of objective impossibility may be based
upon the impossibility of supervising a large operation without delega-
tion to subordinates,184 delegation is not a defense where the corpo-
rate officer is on notice, for example because of prior violations, that
the system of delegation is not working to prevent or correct viola-
tions of the public welfare statute. s5
The offenses in Dotterweich and Park were strict liability of-
fenses. An important question is whether the responsible corporate
officer doctrine may be used to meet the knowledge requirement of a
crime. In other words, may a jury infer that a person holding a re-
sponsible corporate position had knowledge that a statutory require-
ment had not been met? Case law conflicts on this issue.' 6
In sum, the rationale applied in the Dotterweich and Park cases
has potential application to a large number of federal and state crimi-
nal statutes dealing with public welfare offenses. 187
180. Id. at 672.
181. Id. at 673. For discussions of the impossibility defense, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Crimi-
nal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses -Another View, 35 VAND. L. REv.
1337, 1367-74 (1982); Stephen C. Jones, Individual Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act: The Defenses Find a Defendant, 39 FooD DRUG COsM. LJ. 385, 398-400 (1984).
182. Park, 421 U.S. at 664-65
183. Id. at 660.
184. Id. at 677 n.19.
185. See id. at 678.
186. Compare United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669-70 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(holding that knowledge may be inferred from a responsible corporate position), cert denied sub
nom., 469 U.S. 1208 (1985), with United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 51-55 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a mere showing of official responsibility is insufficient;
however, knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence or willful blindness). See
generally Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine -
Can You go to Jail for What You "Don't" Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347 (1992); Ronald M. Broudy,
Note, RCRA and the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Getting Tough on Corporate Of-
fenders by Sidestepping the Mens Rea Requirement, 80 Ky. LJ. 1055 (1991-92).
187. See, eg., State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Haw. 1980) (af-
firming conviction of corporate officers for violations of prohibition on open burning); People v.
Byrne, 494 N.Y.S.2d 257,258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). In Byrne, a complaint was reinstated against
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C. Intracorporate Conspiracy
Conspiracy to commit a criminal offense is generally punishable
as a criminal offense.188 Two important questions regarding intracor-
porate conspiracies are: (1) whether a corporation as a legal entity can
conspire with a single corporate agent and (2) whether two or more
agents of the same corporation can conspire together. 89
A criminal conspiracy requires a plurality of actors. This plurality
requirement is not met where a corporation and only one of its agents
is involved.' 90 Since a corporation can only act through its agents, a
contrary rule transforms every criminal act of a corporate agent acting
on behalf of the corporation into a criminal conspiracy' 9 ' and would,
as one opinion states, "over-extend the fiction of corporate
personality."'19
A closer question is whether the plurality of actors requirement is
met solely by two or more agents of the same corporation acting on
behalf of the corporate business. A number of cases hold that the
plurality requirement may be met solely by the actions of the agents
of a single corporation 9 3 A strong argument can be made that a con-
spiracy among agents of a single corporation may present the very
dangers that conspiracy laws are aimed at preventing, namely "mutual
support, encouragement and an education in criminal methods" as
well as "a focal point for further crimes."'194
an officer and fifty percent shareholder of corporation which owned a bar where a minor was
served. The officer was not present, did not have notice of, nor particpation in the service of the
minor. Id. See generally Lynn Bledsoe, Note, Criminal Liability for Public Welfare Offenses:
Gambler's Choice, 10 MfEM. ST. U. L. RIv. 612 (1980).
188. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 1966); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 421 (1991).
189. See generally Sarah N. Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33
HASTINGS LJ. 1155 (1982).
190. Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909) (discussing an
alleged conspiracy to restrain trade); United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(finding a conspiracy to violate gold laws). But cf. State v. Parker, 158 A. 797, 801 (Conn. 1932)
(dictum) (explaining that in determining whether there is a conspiracy, the corporation may be
counted).
191. Welling, supra note 189, at 1161.
192. United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 968-72 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1170 (1983); United States v. Consol. Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577,579-81 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
194. Welling, supra note 189, at 1199 (discussing the idea that an intracorporate conspiracy is
more harmful to society than individual action and that the actions of multiple agents of a single
corporation should meet the plurality requirement). See also Kathleen F. Brickey, Conspiracy,
Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. Cni. L.REv. 431, 439.40 (1983); John T.
Prisbe, Comment, The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 538, 550-51
(1987).
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Multiple agents of the same corporation meet the plurality re-
quirement where one of the agents is acting on his or her own be-
half.195 "The personally motivated employee is viewed no differently
than someone outside of the corporation because the employee is act-
ing without concern as to whether his actions benefit the corpora-
tion.' 96 In addition, a corporate agent can conspire with agents of a
subsidiary corporation since each corporation is a separate legal en-
tity.197 Finally, a corporate agent can conspire with actors who are
outside of the corporation.198
VIII. STATUTORY LIABILITIES
A corporate agent may be liable under any of a multitude of state
or federal statutes imposing either a statutory penalty or civil liability
for various acts. These provisions include, for example, provisions in
the applicable state corporation statute' 99 and controlling person lia-
bility under federal and state securities laws.2"o Consider the follow-
ing three significant provisions: (1) the provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code making a person required to collect and withhold in-
ternal revenue tax from another person and to pay over the tax to the
United States a trustee of the funds201 and imposing a one hundred
percent penalty for willful failure to collect or to pay over such tax;2
(2) liability for response costs under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA);20 3 and (3)
195. See United States v. Spiezio, 523 F. Supp. 264, 271 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1981); cf. Hughes v.
Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc. 815 F. Supp. 847, 851 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (dictum) (civil
RICO case).
196. Prisbe, supra note 194, at 544.
197. But cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,771 (1984) (hold-
ing that, in civil action for damages, "the coordinated activity of a parent [corporation] and its
wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the
Sherman Act").
198. Cf. Hughs, 815 F. Supp. at 852 n.2 (discussing alleged conspiracy between defendants
associated with two corporations in a civil RICO case); United States v. Kemmel, 160 F. Supp.
718, 721 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (holding that the conspiracy of a corporation and others was properly
charged).
199. For example, sixteen jurisdictions impose a penalty on a corporate officer or agent who
refuses to permit a qualified shareholder to inspect corporate books and records. See MODEL
BusNEss CoRP. Acr. ANN. § 16.04 annot. (1993).
200. See Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 770 (West 1981); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (West 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(b) (Supp. 1992).
201. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (Vest Supp. 1993). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 253 (1991) (dealing
with liability of principal corporate officers for tax assessments against corporation).
202. I.R.C. § 6672 (1993). Any corporate officer or employee with the power to direct the
payment of the taxes is a responsible person within the meaning of these provisions. See Feist v.
United States, 607 F.2d 954, 960 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
203. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44
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provisions which impose liability on corporate officers for debts of a
corporation incurred after the revocation of the corporate charter. 0 4
A discussion of the full scope of these and other potential statutory
liabilities is beyond the scope of this article.
IX. CONCLUSION
Generally an agent for a corporation is not personally liable to a
third person where he or she makes an authorized contract on behalf
of a fully disclosed corporate principal. In addition, he or she is gener-
ally not liable to a third person for making an ultra vires contract on
behalf of the corporation.
A purported corporate agent is liable to a third person where he
or she makes an unauthorized contract on behalf of a corporation or
where he or she fails to fully disclose the identity of the corporate
principal on whose behalf the agent is acting. In addition, a corporate
agent is personally liable for any tortious or criminal acts that he or
she commits on behalf of the corporation. Finally, corporate officers
and agents are subject to various potential penalties and civil liabilities
under federal and state statutes.
In some situations the fact that a corporate agent is acting on
behalf of the corporation may operate to protect the agent from per-
sonal tort or criminal liability. These situations include: (1) where the
agent, acting in good faith on behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his or her official capacity, interferes with a contract or pro-
spective contract; (2) where the agent, acting in his or her official ca-
pacity, makes a defamatory communication that is subject to a
qualified privilege; and (3) some cases in which the agent is charged
with conspiracy.
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). See also Harold J. Cronk & Pat Huddleston, II,
Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What are the Consequences?, 38 MER.
CER L. REv. 677 (1987); David E. Preston, Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil: Corporate
Officer Liability for Response Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com.
pensation and Liability Act, 17 U. ToL L. REv. 923 (1986).
204. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1212(c) (Okla. 1991) (discussing the liability of an officer or
director for debts incurred with his or her "knowledge, approval and consent" after suspension
of charter by the Tax Commission); Nichols-Homeshield, Inc. v. Mid-American Constr. Supply,
643 P.2d 309, 310-11 (Okla. 1982). In comparison, the Delaware statutes expressly provide that
upon reinstatement of the charter, the corporation is exclusively liable on all contracts and acts
done on its behalf during the period of the forfeiture of its charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 312(e) (1991). See also Frederic G. Krapf & Son, Inc. v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713,715 (Del. 1968)(holding that reinstatement absolved officers from personal liability on contract).
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